Embodiment and conceptual structure
This chapter explores in more detail two of the central principles of cognitive semantics introduced in Chapter 5. These are: (1) the thesis that conceptual structure derives from embodiment, also known as the embodied cognition thesis; and (2) the thesis that semantic structure reflects conceptual structure. The reason for exploring these two principles together in a single chapter is because they are inextricably linked: once we have established that conceptual structure is embodied, in the sense that the nature of our embodiment determines and delimits the range and nature of concepts that can be represented, we can then examine how these concepts are encoded and externalised via language by looking at how the language system provides meaning based on concepts derived from embodiment.
We address the thesis of embodied cognition by presenting the theory of image schemas developed by Johnson (1987), among others. As we began to see in the previous chapter, image schemas are relatively abstract conceptual representations that arise directly from our everyday interaction with and observation of the world around us. That is, they are concepts arising from embodied experience. Once we have described the research on image schemas, and how they derive from embodiment, we then address the second principle. This is the thesis that embodiment, as the basis of conceptual organisation, should be evident in semantic structure: the meanings associated with words and other linguistic elements. In order to explore this thesis, we examine Leonard Talmy’s theory of conceptual structure. In his influential work, Talmy has argued that one of the ways that language encodes conceptual representation is by providing structural meaning, also known as schematic meaning. This kind of meaning relates to structural properties of referents (the entities that language describes: objects, people, and so on) and scenes (the situations and events that language describes). Talmy argues that schematic meaning is directly related to fundamental aspects of embodied cognition, and can be divided into a number of distinct schematic systems, each of which provides a distinct type of meaning that is closely associated with a particular kind of embodied experience. Talmy’s work presents compelling evidence from language that semantic structure reflects conceptual structure, and that conceptual structure arises from embodied experience.
The reader should bear in mind that Johnson’s theory of image schemas and Talmy’s work on the conceptual system represent two highly influential yet independent lines of research within cognitive semantics. However, we treat them together in this chapter because they relate to two of the most basic guiding principles of cognitive semantics: (1) that conceptual structure reflects embodied experience, which Johnson’s theory addresses; and (2) that semantic structure reflects this conceptual structure, which Talmy’s theory addresses. The relationship between these areas of investigation is represented in Figure 6.1.
