Metonymy as an access mechanism
We noted above that Kövecses and Radden define metonymy in terms of the conceptual access it affords. This idea is based on proposals made by Langacker (1993: 30) who argues that ‘the entity that is normally designated by a metonymic expression serves as a reference point affording mental access to the desired target (that is, the entity actually being referred to)’. In other words, metonymy serves as point of access to a particular aspect of a domain and thus provides access to the target concept. Furthermore, each vehicle provides a different route into the relevant conceptual domain.
According to Croft (1993), a target is accessed within a domain as a result of domain highlighting. Croft takes as his starting point the encyclopaedic view of meaning and adopts Langacker’s theory of domains (see Chapter 7). Recall that Langacker’s theory holds that a concept profile is understood with respect to a domain matrix: the range of domains that contribute to our ultimate understanding of the concept. This accounts for the fact that lexical items relate to potentially huge knowledge structures. Croft’s proposal is that, from the perspective of encyclopaedic semantics, metonymy functions by highlighting one domain within a concept’s domain matrix. Thus a particular usage of a lexical concept can highlight distinct domains within the concept’s domain matrix on different occasions. Consider the following examples drawn from Croft (1993):
Part of the domain matrix associated with Marcel Proust is that he was a man known for particular habits relating to how much time he spent in bed. This is knowledge about Proust the man. Another aspect of the domain matrix relates to Proust’s literary work and his career as a writer. While the expression Proust in (41a) highlights the domain for Proust (Proust the man), the expression Proust in (41b) highlights the literary work of Proust. Thus, from the perspective of domain matrices, a particular expression can metonymically highlight distinct, albeit related, aspects of our encyclopaedic knowledge relating to Proust.
The claim that metonymy relates to a highlighted domain in a domain matrix does not amount to the claim that metonymy is a cross-domain relationship in the sense intended by metaphor theorists. Clearly, the example in (41b) is still an ‘X stands for Y’ relation (a metonym) rather than an ‘X under stood in terms of Y’ relation (a metaphor). Croft argues that while metaphor requires an association across two wholly distinct sets of domain matrices, as we have seen, metonymy highlights a particular aspect of a single domain matrix.
