Beyond prepositions
The attraction for cognitive semanticists in studying prepositions like over has been their direct grounding in spatial experience. In this respect, prepositions provide a transparent illustration of the thesis of embodied cognition, particularly in terms of how concepts in the spatio-physical realm are extended to concepts that are less clearly grounded in spatio-physical experience such as COMPLETION, CONTROL and TIME. However, the approach developed by Tyler and Evans is, in principle, applicable to all lexical classes. We illustrate this point with a discussion of two lexical items from other word classes: the noun time and the verb fly.
Noun: time
Evans (2004a) further developed the Principled Polysemy approach in order to investigate the polysemy associated with the abstract noun time. Evans pro poses three criteria for establishing distinct senses associated with time:
1. The meaning criterion: For a sense to count as distinct, it must contain additional meaning not apparent in any other senses associated with time.
2. The concept elaboration criterion: A distinct sense will feature unique or highly distinct patterns of concept elaboration. Concept elaboration relates to semantic selection restrictions which determine how the lexical concept can be metaphorically structured and thus elaborated at the linguistic level. Concept elaboration may relate to how the noun is modified (a short time), to the verb phase that forms a sentence with the noun phrase (Thetimesped by), or to an adverbial element (The time went by quickly).
3. The grammatical criterion:
A distinct sense may manifest unique or highly distinct structural dependencies. That is, it may occur in specific kinds of grammatical constructions. Hence, for a sense to be distinct it must exhibit distinctive grammatical behaviour.
In order to illustrate how these criteria apply, consider examples (18) and (19).
In (18), the examples relate to one aspect of our experience of DURATION in which time appears to be proceeding more quickly than usual. As we saw in Chapter 3, this psychologically real phenomenon is called temporal com pression. In contrast, the examples in (19) do not relate to our experience of duration but our experience of discrete points in time, without regard for their duration (MOMENT). Hence, the expression time has quite distinct meanings associated with it in each set of examples. This means that the two senses are distinct according to the meaning criterion.
In terms of the second criterion, the examples in (18) and (19) have distinct patterns of concept elaboration (metaphorical structuring) associated with them. The TEMPORAL COMPRESSION meaning associated with time can be elaborated in terms of motion, which is either rapid as in example (18) or imperceptible as in example (20).
On the other hand, the MOMENT meaning in (19) has to be elaborated in terms of motion that is terminal in nature which is therefore oriented with respect to a specific reference point (e.g. NOW). In other words, elaborating the MOMENT sense of time in terms of rapid or imperceptible motion results in extremely unnatural sentences that are difficult to interpret. This is illustrated by example (21a), which can be explained on the basis that rapid or imperceptible motion is incompatible with a reading involving the imminent occurrence of a discrete temporal MOMENT:
Equally, elaborating the TEMPORAL COMPRESSION sense of time in terms of terminal motion cancels the TEMPORAL COMPRESSION reading and forces a MOMENT reading as illustrated by example (22).
This fact that these two senses of time respond differently to concept elaboration satisfies the second criterion, suggesting that these readings qualify as dis tinct senses.
In terms of the third criterion which relates to the grammatical realisation of distinct senses, observe that the TEMPORAL COMPRESSION sense is encoded by a mass noun, one diagnostic of which is that time cannot take the singular indefinite article (a), as shown in (23).
In contrast, the MOMENT sense is encoded by a count noun and can co-occur with the indefinite article:
The fact that the two senses of time pattern differently in terms of grammatical behaviour means that they are also distinct senses according to the third criterion. Taken together, these three criteria provide persuasive evidence for the view that we are dealing with two distinct lexical concepts or senses of time.
Verb: fly
Although they were originally developed for the analysis of the single lexical item time which relates to a relatively narrow subset of one lexical class (abstract nouns), the criteria discussed above provide a promising direction for the analysis of concrete nouns and other lexical classes including adjectives and verbs. For example, consider how these criteria might serve to provide a lexical semantic analysis of the motion verb fly, illustrated by the examples in (25):
In terms of the meaning criterion, each instance of fly in (25) represents a dis tinct sense. The meaning in (25a), which we will identify as sense 1, can be rep resented as SELF-PROPELLED AERODYNAMIC MOTION and entails absence of contact with the ground. The meaning in (25b), sense 2, can be represented as OPERATION BY AGENT OF ENTITY CAPABLE OF AERODYNAMIC MOTION. The meaning in (25c), sense 3, can be represented as CONTROL OF LIGHTWEIGHT ENTITY BYAGENT (for example, using an attachment like a piece of string, with the result that it remains airborne). The meaning in (25d), sense 4, can be rep resented as SUSPENSION OF LIGHTWEIGHT OBJECT (like a flag, with the result that it remains extended and visible).
In terms of the second criterion, which relates to concept elaboration and resulting semantic selectional restrictions, there are a number of distinct pat terns in evidence. For example, the different senses of fly appear to require dis tinct kinds of semantic arguments. For instance, sense 1 can only apply to entities that are capable of self-propelled aerodynamic motion. Entities that are not self-propelled, like tennis balls, cannot be used in this sense (*the tennis ball is flying in the sky).
Sense 2 is restricted to the operation by an AGENT of entities that can undergo self-propelled aerodynamic motion and the entity must therefore be able to accommodate the AGENT and thereby serve as a means of transport. This explains why planes and hot air balloons are compatible with this sense but entities unable to accommodate an AGENT are not. This is illustrated by example (26).
In the case of sense 3, this sense is restricted to entities that are capable of becoming airborne by turbulence and can be controlled by an AGENT on the ground. This sense appears to be specialised for objects like kites and model aeroplanes.
Sense 4 relates to entities that can be horizontally extended by virtue of air turbulence yet retain contact with the ground by virtue of remaining physically attached to another (non-agentive) fixed entity. This sense can be applied to flags as well as hair and scarves, which can ‘fly in the wind’. In sum, each of the four senses discussed here appear to restrict the kind of entities to which the verb can be applied and are therefore distinct senses according to the second criterion.
In terms of the third criterion, there are also grammatical differences associated with the senses presented which are most clearly manifested in terms of transitivity. For instance, while senses 1 and 4 are intransitive (they cannot take a direct object), senses 2 and 3 are transitive (they either can (sense 2) or must (sense 3) take a direct object). Hence, it appears that the three lines of evidence developed in Evans (2004a, 2005) provide the basis for a methodology for distinguishing distinct senses across a wider range of lexical classes. The senses of fly discussed in this section are summarised in Table 10.5.
