The conceptual basis of word classes
Like Talmy, Langacker argues that word classes have a conceptual basis. In other words, the linguistic categories noun, verb, adjective and so on are not ‘purely grammatical’ categories with ‘purely formal’ properties (such as the affixes they take or their patterns of distribution within phrases and sentences). Instead, Langacker argues that these categories have a conceptual basis and can therefore be semantically characterised. According to Langacker’s model, linguistic expressions divide into two broad categories: nominal predications and relational predications. This distinction relates to the nature of the schematic meaning encoded by nouns and noun phrases (nominals) on the one hand, and by other lexical classes like verbs adjectives, prepositions and so on (relations) on the other. The term ‘predication’ relates to meaning and refers to the semantic pole of a symbolic unit. Nominal predications are conceptually autonomous, which means that they relate to conceptually independent entities like BED or SLIPPER: the expressions bed or slipper invoke concepts that are independently meaningful. In contrast, relational predications are conceptually dependent, which means that they rely on other units to complete their meaning, which are relational in nature. For example, in a sentence like George hid the slipper under the bed, the verb hid relates the conceptually autonomous entities GEORGE, SLIPPER and BED, establishing a relationship involving ‘hiding’ between them. Similarly, under establishes a spatial relation between SLIPPER and BED.
Nominal predications
Langacker argues that physical objects are the prototypical referents for the noun category, but as with any category, there are central and prototypical members. Langacker therefore proposes a highly schematic characterisation of the noun class: a noun encodes a region in some domain, and a count noun encodes a bounded region in some domain (recall our discussion of domains in Chapter 7). A region is defined as a ‘set of interconnected entities’ (Langacker 2002: 67). Sometimes the entities that comprise the region are homogeneous at least as far as the boundary (for example, bleep, pond), and sometimes they are individuated (for example, bicycle, cat, piano, constellation). This notion of homogeneity versus individuation is reminiscent of Talmy’s parameter of dividedness, where quantities of SPACE and TIME are either continuous or discrete. As we saw earlier, a region is bounded if there is some inherent limit to the set of entities that constitute it. For example, a CON STELLATION is bounded because it is a bounded region in a ‘bigger picture’ of SKY.A mass noun encodes an unbounded regionin some domain. The concepts encoded by mass nouns can also differ in terms of how homogeneous or individuated the entities are that compose them (compare water and furniture, for example). Because count nouns are bounded they are replicable, which is why they can be counted; this property does not hold for mass nouns. As this brief sketch illustrates, Langacker relies upon a similar core of conceptual properties as Talmy in his characterisation of the noun category.
Relational predications
While nominal predications describe entities, relational predications describe relations between entities. Langacker divides the category of relational predications into two subcategories: temporal and atemporal relations. Temporal relations are processes and are encoded by verbs. The category of atemporal relations is a more disparate category and contains prepositions, adjectives, adverbs and non-finite verb forms (infinitives and participles). The domain of TIME underlies the distinction between temporal and atemporal relations. In describing the role of time in this distinction, Langacker distinguishes conceived time from processing time. We can think of processing time as ‘real time’, in the sense that any cognitive process requires processing time. In this sense, processing time is a medium of conceptualisation. On the other hand, conceived time refers to the cognitive representation of TIME, where time is an object of conceptualisation (see Evans 2004a, 2004b for a discussion of studies that take this approach). Within conceived time, Langacker distinguishes the processes of summary scanning and sequential scanning, where ‘scanning’ relates to how the aspects of a scene are perceived, visually or otherwise, and give rise to a conceptual representation. In summary scanning, aspects of a scene are scanned cumulatively and are simultaneously present in the conceptual representation. This gives rise to a Gestalt representation of time as a unified whole and characterises static scenes. In sequential scanning, the aspects of a scene are scanned in a sequential fashion, so that the aspects of the scene are not simultaneously present at any stage of the scanning. This gives rise to a conceptualisation of time as a dynamic process and characterises events.
Langacker likens the distinction between summary and sequential scanning to the difference between looking at a photograph (summary scanning) and watching a film (sequential scanning). While all aspects of a scene are simultaneously present in a photograph which presents a static scene, a film involves a sequence of scenes, each different from the next.
