Definition, understanding and use
What is the point of defining meaning? In some domains of human activity, definitions function as the guarantors of the consistency of language. This is particularly so in science and technology. If metallurgists, for example, did not have any fixed working definition of terms like iron or copper, it would be impossible to check that two metallurgists talking about iron, for example, were in fact talking about the same substance. Needless to say, this need for checking does not usually arise in a domain like metallurgy, where the definitions of terms are well established; in any cases of doubt, however, it is precisely the existence of the definition that provides the ultimate guarantee that language is being used in a consistent way. The law is another obvious domain in which the role of definition is central. Juridical terms like murder, contract or fraud require clear definitions which fi x their denotation by designating exactly what does and does not count as an example of each. The provision of these definitions is a time-consuming and unending process, and there is often little agreement as to what the ‘true’ definition of such terms actually is. But whenever a legal argument is mounted about the appropriateness of a certain legal term to a certain situation, it is, in effect, that term’s definition in that domain which is in question.
The case of ordinary uses of natural language is both similar and different. Mostly, conversation and other examples of language proceed without the need for explicit definition: this is only ever required to resolve confusions. And when we do ask forclarification about the correct use of a word, nominal definitions of words’ meanings are not usually either solicited or provided. Thus, if I am unsure about the meaning of the word dupe, I am more likely to ask the question ‘what’s a dupe?’ rather than the question ‘what does dupe mean?’ Furthermore, the answer I receive will usually not, as noted by Riegel (1990: 97–98), be of the form ‘the word dupe means/signifies/designates a gullible person’, but rather of the form, ‘a dupe is a gullible person’. Even when a genuine nominal definition is offered, the gap between a cognitive and an extensional definition is very great. Thus, I can defi ne the meaning of water extensionally as H2O, but if the addressee of the definition has no knowledge of chemistry this definition will not be effective in bringing about an understanding of the word’s meaning.
But definitions do take on a central role in language use if we take concepts to be essentially definitional in nature, and assume that concepts are or enter into the meanings of words. If concepts correspond to word meanings, and word meanings can be captured in definitions, then it is the definition which is in some sense activated during language use. To claim that definitions are involved in language use in this way is not to claim that they are so involved consciously. We may be quite able to use a word appropriately, without being able to phrase a satisfactory definition of it: the knowledge enabling correct use of the word is unconscious, and in no way implies an ability to produce an explicit definition. To say, then, that concepts are or function as definitions is certainly not to say that we consciously carry around a dictionary-like list in our heads.
