Meaning construction in cognitive semantics

In contrast to formal semantics which relies on the objectivist thesis, cognitive semantics adopts an experientialist perspective. According to this view, external reality exists, but the way in which we mentally represent the world is a function of embodied experience (recall the discussion of embodied cognition in Chapter 2). Thus meaning construction proceeds not by ‘matching up’ sentences with objectively defined ‘states of affairs’, but on the basis of linguistic expressions ‘prompting’ for highly complex conceptual processes which construct meaning based on sophisticated encyclopaedic knowledge.

In one important respect then, the view of ‘meaning’ developed in earlier chapters oversimplifies the picture. Throughout the book, we have used terms like ‘encode’ and ‘externalise’ in order to describe the function of language in relation to concepts. According to this view, semantic structure is the conventional form that conceptual structure takes when encoded in language, and represents a body of stored knowledge that language simply reflects. However, the expression ‘encode’ oversimplifies the relationship between language and cognition and requires some qualification.

Firstly, the meanings ‘encoded’ in language (the semantic representations associated with linguistic units) are partial and incomplete representations of conceptual structure. For example, we saw in Chapter 7 that conceptual structure is underpinned by information derived from perceptual processes, including sensory and introspective (or subjective) experience. While the rep resentations of this experience that make up our conceptual system (including frames, domains, ICMs, conceptual metaphors and so on) are less rich in detail than perceptual experience itself, the representations encoded by semantic structure are still further reduced in detail. Moreover, conceptual representation is thought to be ultimately perceptual in nature, a view that is suggested by the perceptual simulations that conceptual structure can provide. For example, one can mentally simulate (that is, mentally rehearse or imagine) the stages involved in taking a penalty kick in a football match. In contrast, semantic representation is specialised for expression via a symbolic system. This means that the linguistic system, which consists of spoken, written or signed symbols, ‘loses’ much of the richness associated with the multimodal character of conceptual representation. By way of analogy, if we were to take the six-stream digital sound reproduction available in modern cinema multiplexes and compress this through a single speaker, not only would some of the sounds be lost (for example, the bass track, background sounds and the experience of ‘moving’ sounds), but the nature and detail of the remaining sounds would also be significantly impoverished: the mono sound becomes a very partial and incomplete clue to what the original sounds might have been like

. In a similar way, although semantic structure ‘encodes’ conceptual structure, the format of semantic structure ensures that language can only ever provide minimal clues to the precise mental representation intended by the speaker. In other words, language does encode ‘meaning’, but this meaning is impoverished and functions as prompts for the construction of richer patterns of conceptualisation by the hearer. The cognitive semanticist Mark Turner has expressed this idea in the following way:

 Expressions do not mean; they are prompts for us to construct meanings by working with processes we already know. In no sense is the meaning of [an]. . .utterance ‘right there in the words.’ When we understand an utterance, we in no sense are understanding ‘just what the words say’; the words themselves say nothing independent of the richly detailed knowledge and powerful cognitive processes we bring to bear. (Turner 1991: 206)

Secondly, the cognitive view holds that conceptualisation emerges from language use in context. It follows that there is no principled distinction between semantics and pragmatics. Formal approaches often assume that assigning meaning to an utterance is a two-stage process. In the first stage, context independent word meanings are decoded by the hearer and composed into the context-independent semantic representation of a sentence. In the second stage, the utterance undergoes pragmatic processing which brings to bear information relating to context, background knowledge and inferences made by the hearer regarding speaker intentions. In contrast, Mental Spaces Theory assumes that conceptualisation is guided by discourse context, which forms an integral part of the meaning construction process. According to this view, meaning construction is localised and situated, which entails that pragmatic (context-dependent) information and knowledge inform and guide the meaning construction process. Thus, while pragmatic knowledge may be qualitatively distinct from semantic knowledge (the impoverished information encoded by linguistic prompts), semantic knowledge is only meaningful in context. As we saw in Chapter 7, cognitive semanticists therefore reject the assumption that there are distinct ‘semantic’ and ‘pragmatic’ stages in meaning construction, together with the assumption that there exists some meaningful boundary between these two kinds of knowledge: both are aspects of encyclopaedic knowledge.

Finally, conceptualisation is held to rely upon complex conceptual processing, which involves conceptual projections of the kind that have been dis cussed so far in this book. These include conceptual metaphors, conceptual metonymies and the process of schema induction that was first introduced in Chapter 5. This is the process whereby our conceptualisations are elaborated and enriched by the application of large-scale and pre-assembled knowledge structures which serve a contextualising function. Schema induction is of central importance for meaning construction, as we will see in this chapter. Conceptual projection mechanisms like metaphor, metonymy and schema induction establish mappings. As we have already established (Chapter 9), a mapping connects entities in one conceptual region with another. These mappings can be highly conventionalised, as in the case of primary conceptual metaphors, or they can be constructed ‘on-line’ for purposes of local understanding. Gilles Fauconnier summarises this position as follows:

 Language, as we use it, is but the tip of the iceberg of cognitive construction. As discourse unfolds, much is going on behind the scenes: New domains appear, links are forged, abstract meanings operate, internal structure emerges and spreads, viewpoint and focus keep shifting. Everyday talk and commonsense reasoning are supported by   invisible, highly abstract, mental creations, which . . . [language] . . . helps to guide, but does not by itself define. (Fauconnier 1994: xxii–xxiii)

In sum, meaning is not simply pre-existing stored knowledge encoded by language. Cognitive semanticists argue that the naive view, which views words as ‘containers’ for meaning and language as a conduit for the transfer or externalisation of pre-existing meaning, is erroneous (see Reddy [1979] 1993). Instead, meaning construction is seen as a complex process that takes place at the conceptual level. Words and grammatical constructions are merely partial and impoverished prompts upon which highly complex cognitive processes work giving rise to rich and detailed conceptualisation.

 In his pioneering work on meaning construction, Fauconnier demonstrates that much of what goes on in the construction of meaning occurs ‘behind the scenes’. He argues that language does not encode thought in its complex entirety, but encodes rather rudimentary instructions for the creation of rich and elaborate ideas. It is because the principles and strategies that guide this conceptualisation process are largely unseen that the rather simplistic view has arisen that meaning construction is achieved by simply ‘decoding’ the meaning inherent ‘in’ language. Fauconnier calls the unseen conceptualisation processes that are involved in meaning construction back stage cognition.

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مواضيع ذات صلة

Sentence meaning in formal semantics

Meaning construction and mental spaces

Word meaning and radial categories Summery

Knowledge context: ways of seeing

Sentential context: facets

Usage context: subsenses

The importance of context for polysemy

Beyond prepositions

Illustration of a radial category based on Principled Polysemy

Establishing the prototypical sense

Distinguishing between senses

The Principled Polysemy approach